UPB: A poor attempt at validating NAP

p 80.”If everyone should take their own pleasure regardless of their victim’s displeasure, then Bob has no right
to rape Doug, since although Bob prefers to rape Doug, Doug most certainly does not prefer to be raped.
If everyone should take their pleasure regardless of the displeasure of others, then there is no rational
reason why Bob’s preference to rape Doug should take precedence over Doug’s preference to not be
raped, regardless of the displeasure that refusing to be raped would cause Bob.”

  1. upb is the name of set of behaviors yet steph insists it cannot determine what is UPB only evaluate theories. yet you can arbitrarily focus any theory to classify a particular action as moral or immoral. if steph’s claim is true, then it effectively should be able to evaluate the morality of particular actions.
  2. the proof of upb seems to try to use the structure of “proof by contradiction”. but the proof isnt valid because of the definition of UPB as a normative classification of behavior and in his proof he assumes UPB is a positive set of moral actions, either in a “can” or an “is” sense. also there is nothing inherently contradictory about someone preferring murder since murder isnt dependent on what the victim thinks of the act.  also the act of preferring to be murdered and murdering are two different actions pivoting on the word behavior. this is a case of conflating them just because they pivot on a critical word. his two man room proof is convoluted form of proof by contradiction.
  3. steph seems to be confused about “opposites”.  i think he conflates two ideas in mathematics.  the idea of set complements, and additive inverses. rape without killing the victim is technically “not murder” and you cant have an “opposite” of an action fall in the opposite moral category unless youre working with a continuous quantitative measurement where classification of action is transposed onto the real number line.

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